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1. Introduction 
 
Why to coordinate a supply chain with contracts? What are supply chains and which impor-
tance they have in economic practice? Joseph J. Spengler (1950) was the first researcher who 
defined in his scientific paper “Vertical integration and antitrust policy” the term “double 
marginalization” and has got the ball rolling for further research.1 
Basically the main problem by which researchers are confronted is performance inefficiency 
resulting in ordering to little.2 This inefficiency results from having at least two companies 
instead of having one company in a supply chain. In detail, we can distinguish between differ-
ent companies being independent, acting alone and being responsible for their own mark-up. 
Hence, every involved company adds value to a product by producing, upgrading, transport-
ing and selling. For example, a manufacturer produces a specific product and sells it to a re-
tailer who resells it to end-consumer. 
All companies involved in the supply chain maximize their profits. They are characterized by 
risk neutrality3. The retailer is confronted with stochastic demand meaning that he does not 
know how much the end-consumer will buy during the season. In the case of deterministic 
demand in which the retailer knows the number of sales in advance it is possible to decrease 
the double-marginalization effect to zero.4 
The reason for having a problem with “double-marginalization” and consequently with supply 
chain inefficiency is due to the fact that the retailer orders too little as compared with an inte-
grated supply chain. Hence, the optimal quantity in an integrated supply chain is the bench-
mark for the comparism of coordination mechanisms. 
A lot has been done by researches to solve the problem of “double marginalization” and its 
consequences to supply chain performance. Therefore, contractual agreements as coordination 
mechanisms were developed to improve the supply chain performance. 
The paper of Lariviere and Porteus (2001) can be seen as a starting point for the research of 
supply chains with regards to efficiency. They have studied the consequences of a wholesale-
price contract (also called the price-only contract) to total supply chain profits. Their results 
indicate that a price-only contract could never be a coordination mechanism in the sense that 
the retailer would order more. But they have also stated reasons in which a price-only contract 
                                            
1
 See Spengler, J. (1950), pp. 347-352 
2
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), p. 293. 
3
 See Pasternack, B. A. (1985), p. 133. 
4
 For elimination of the „double marginalization effect“ see Kolay, S., Shaffer, G., Ordover, J. A. (2004),  
  pp.431-437 in the case of complete information. 
2 
could be better off in contrast to other coordinating contracts in relation to specific demand 
properties.5 
The researchers Cachon and Lariviere (2005) have examined the consequences of a specific 
marginal revenue curve to supply chain efficiency under a wholesale-price contract. They 
stated that under specific assumptions it is more difficult to implement a coordination me-
chanism because of the additional administrative burden it causes.6 
The researchers have critical grappled with coordination mechanisms being already applied in 
economic practice. 
The procedure of a revenue-sharing contract has been implemented by Blockbusters Inc. who 
was faced with customer dissatisfaction because of having too little videocassettes for rental 
in their stores.7 The buyback contract has already been applied by the journals- and maga-
zines-industry under which the producers bought back unsold units at the end of the day or 
week.8 The sales-rebate contract under which the parties agree on price deductions on higher 
sales is used by HP through a specific reward program.9 And the quantity-flexibility contract 
is used by companies such as Microsystems, Nippon Otis, Solectron, Toyota Motor Corpora-
tion and Compaq.10 
All the above mentioned coordination mechanisms aim to achieve a better supply chain per-
formance in the sense of giving an incentive to a retailer to order more. Consequently, the 
total supply chain profit increases and makes the supply chain more efficient. 
Hence, this working paper deals with the question how it is possible to improve a supply 
chain in the matter of increasing the total supply chain profits and consequently to improve 
supply chain efficiency. 
The working paper is structured as follows: In §§ 2-6 different coordination mechanisms will 
be discussed in reference to supply chain efficiency. Corresponding graphs shall show on one 
side the problems and on other side the solutions for the total supply chain. In § 2.1 the mod-
el, notations and assumptions for further research will be presented in more detail.11 
It will be shown that the contracts discussed in §§ 3-6 coordinates the supply chain: The re-
tailer orders more and the total supply chain profit increases. Finally, in § 7 the main results 
will be summarized. 
                                            
5
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), pp. 296-301. 
6
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), pp. 38-40. 
7
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), pp. 30-31. 
8
 See Pasternack, B. A (1985), pp. 133-140. 
9
 See http://www.hprewards.co.uk. 
10
 See Tsay, A. A. (1999), p. 1340. 
11
 Based on Cachon, G. P. (2003), pp. 233-237. 
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2. The wholesale-price contract12 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The basis in studying supply chain coordination with contracts is the wholesale price contract. 
An intensive analysis in this respect was made by Lariviere and Porteus (2001). 
The reason for operational research in this scientific area is the supply chain inefficiency re-
sulting of the fact having two firms instead of having one firm. In other words, we have two 
profit realizations whereby in the first case the margin is lower than in the second case. The 
aim is to develop contracts as coordination instruments to increase efficiency in reference to 
the total supply chain performance. 
Spengler (1950) called this fact as „double marginalization“13. He engaged in this area of re-
search because of the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States saw it illegal to inte-
grate one firm in another. They had the opinion that this strategy leads to reduced competition 
without consideration the differentiation and impact of horizontal and vertical integration.14 
„Double marginalization“can be illustrated by the case that the retailer takes too little on stock 
as in the case of an integrated channel. Therefore coordination mechanism such as the buy-
back contract (Pasternack 1985), the revenue sharing contract (Cachon, Lariviere 2005), the 
quantity-flexibility contract (Tsay, Lovejoy 1999), and the sales rebate contract (Taylor 2002) 
were developed to receive a better supply chain performance. But these coordination mechan-
isms are linked with an administrative burden. Consequently we have first to investigate a 
price-only contract to make further research in relation to other contracts to determine in 
which extent the administrative expense is worth bearing.15 
An example for an administrative burden could be in the sense of a collaborative relationship 
whereby the manufacturer has to monitor the sales of the retailer to assess the revenue for 
profit sharing. This example is important associated with a revenue sharing contract which we 
will discuss later.16 
Now we have to define the model. The supply chain consists of two persons: the manufacturer 
producing the necessary quantity of a single product and sets the wholesale price and the sup-
                                            
12
 Based on Cachon, G. P. (2003). 
13
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), p.293. 
14
 See Spengler (1950), p. 347. 
15
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), p. 293. 
16
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 31. 
plier, who orders a specific amount of goods from the manufacturer and sells it to the custo
er after random demand is realized
tions between the manufacturer and the retailer.
 
 
As can be seen in figure 1 we have a time horizon of one. In reality it can be counted as one 
year. Further it is a classical newsvendor problem. The retailer orders a specific amount of the 
single product without knowing demand. After demand is realized t
with two situations, i.e. that either he has ordered too much or he has ordered too little of the 
single product.19 
Additional another important question arise in this context. Because there are two parties i
volved in that process it has to be answered, 
be defined and calculated. Therefore we have to consider of two scenarios: First we assume 
having one business, also called an integrated channel, where the manuf
er operates under the same company name. It is regulated by transfer paymen
mark-up. Second we assume a situation 
If we compare the resulting profits in 
supply chain efficiency. Hence, we have two different profits sizes
An important assumption in this model is that the 
leader. He decides on the highness of the wholesale price
tegic game.20 
A very interesting fact in relation 
bution is its impact to the supply chain efficiency
manufacturer and retailer. Lariviere and Porteus (2001) 
tion (the division of the standard deviation by the me
important function for the total performance. In their research they call it “
ty”. As relative variability falls the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price, which leads 
                                            
17
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), p. 294
18
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 234. 
19
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newsvendor_problem
20
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), p. 294 and
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stackelberg_leader
4 
. The following time line gives an overview on the intera
17
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he retailer is 
how the resulting supply chain inefficiency can 
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5 
into a better supply chain efficiency. Hence, he gets a larger portion of the supply chain prof-
it.21 
Therefore, it is possible that the supply chain with a price-only contract get better-off than 
with another coordination mechanism in connection with an additional administrative burden. 
Lariviere and Porteus (2001) proposed two possibilities, in which the manufacturer will set a 
smaller wholesale price. In the case of a fixed-price newsvendor (the retail price is exogen-
ously) the manufacturer can increase the wholesale price without an impact on demand. 
Hence, in a situation where the retailer can be seen as price-setting newsvendor (the retail 
price is not exogenously and the retailer influences demand) the manufacturer would not in-
crease the wholesale price. A higher wholesale price would imply a higher retail price. A 
higher retail price would imply less demand. Consequently the optimal quantity would not be 
achieved and there would not be an improvement of the supply chain performance.22 
The second possibility where the manufacturer is forced to set a low wholesale price is in the 
case of a “more powerful retailer”. The retailer has opportunity costs. He has alternative pos-
sibilities to make business. Therefore the manufacturer has to take into consideration his “res-
ervation utility” as secondary condition to maximize his profit.23 
In the next subchapters we will discuss more about the wholesale-price contract, which is 
playing an important role for further study and being often watched in practice. 
Therefore we begin by formulating our newsvendor-model in detail. Afterwards, we compare 
the result of an integrated supply chain (= single business) with the sum of the profits from 
the manufacturer and the retailer resulting in a supply chain (=no single business). Hence, 
when we can say more about supply chain inefficiency, it is possible to answer our question 
why the wholesale-price contract does not belong to the coordination mechanisms and ascer-
tain the reasons why to develop supply-chain contracts. 
2.2 The model24 
 
As mentioned above we have two persons in our supply chain: the manufacturer who produc-
es the single product and the retailer who orders the single product to the manufacturer and 
sells it to the end-consumer. These persons are risk neutral and are maximizing their expected 
profit.25 
                                            
21
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), p. 294. 
22
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), p. 301. 
23
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), p. 294 and p. 301. 
24
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), pp. 233-242. 
25
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_neutrality. 
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We face stochastic demand with a time horizon of one. The following sequence occurs: The 
manufacturer offers the retailer a wholesale-price contract, which he can accept or reject. In 
the case of agreement to the offered contract terms the retailer orders a specific amount of the 
single product and afterwards, demand happens.26 
For now we assume that the retailer has no opportunity costs and he is a fixed-price newsven-
dor, meaning he has no bargaining power. 
A further important assumption is that the ordered quantity corresponds to the produced quan-
tity due to the contractual enforcement. In this context it has to be mentioned that there are 
two different compliance regimes: “voluntary compliance” and “forced compliance” as stu-
died by Cachon and Lariviere (2001). Under a compliance regime the manufacturer is respon-
sible to have the ordered quantity of the single product on stock otherwise he has to take the 
legal consequences into account. Under voluntary compliance the ordered quantity is inde-
pendent of legal consequences on stock.27 
In the next step we define the necessary variables:28 
 
r ……………………...…Retail price 
mc ……………………….Production costs – manufacturer 
rc ………………………..Marginal costs - retailer 
rg …………………….....Goodwill costs - retailer 
mg ……………………....Goodwill costs - manufacturer 
v ……………………...…Salvage value 
w ……………………..…Wholesale price 
mr ccc += ……………...Total costs of the supply chain 
mr ggg += ………….…Total goodwill costs of the supply chain 
∫+−=
q
dyyyfqFqqS
0
)())(1()(
 
∫−=
q
dyyFqqS
0
)()( …...Expected sales 
)()( qSqqI −= ………...Expected leftover inventory 
)()( qSqL −= µ ………..Expected lost sales 
                                            
26
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 234. 
27
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2001), p. 630-631 and Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 236. 
28
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), pp. 233-238. 
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The value of unsold goods is the salvage value at the end of the season. Goodwill costs occur 
in the situation of lost sales. Therefore, the retailers profit function is 
 
)()()()( qvIqLgqcwqqrSq rrr +−−−=pi  (1)29 
 
and the manufacturers profit function is 
 
)()( qLgqcwqq mmm −−=pi  (2).30 
 
The supply chains total profit can be determined as 
 
µ
pipi
gqvcqSgvr
qvIqgLcqqrSq mr
−−−+−=
+−−=+=Π
)()()(
)()()()(
 (3).31 
 
In the next subchapter we will discuss the supply chain performance and we will answer the 
question whether the wholesale-price as coordination mechanism is a coordinating contract or 
not? 
 
2.3 Wholesale-price contract and its consequences to supply chain 
performance32 
 
In our game the manufacturer offers the retailer a contract being accepted by the retailer. The 
retailer knows now the offered wholesale-price and he maximizes his profit function. Hence, 
he differentiates his profit function (1) with respect to q and receives the following optimal 
quantity. 
 
q
wqgqvcqSgvr
q
rrrr
∂
−−−−+−∂
=
∂
∂ ))()()(( µpi
 
)()()( * vcwqSgvr rrr −+−′+−= 33 
                                            
29
 See Cachon, G.P. (2003), p. 236. 
30
 See Cachon, G.P. (2003), p. 236. 
31
 See Cachon, G.P. (2003), p. 237. 
32
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), pp .238-239. 
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By understanding the problem of supply chain inefficiency we have to differentiate the profit 
function of an integrated supply chain with respect to q to obtain the optimal order quantity. 
 
q
gqvcqSgvr
q ∂
−−−+−∂
=
∂
Π∂ ))()()(( µ
 
)()()( vcqSgvr o −−′+−=  
 
If we compare the optimal quantity *
rq  being chosen by the retailer in a supply chain with the 
optimal quantity oq  in an integrated supply chain the following can be seen: 
 
gvr
vcqS o
+−
−
=′)(  ≠  
r
r
r gvr
vcw
qS
+−
−+
=′)( *
 (4)34. 
 
These results illustrates that the wholesale-price is not a coordination mechanism in the sense 
of improvement of the supply chain performance.  
The wholesale-price is not a coordinating contract but it is the basis for further study as men-
tioned above in the introduction. 
 
In compliance with (4) the retailer does not order the optimal quantity oq . 
Now the question arises at which wholesale-price the retailer orders the optimal quantity so 
that there is no supply chain inefficiency.35 
To answer this question we have to equate formula (4) and calculate the necessary wholesale 
price: 
 
r
r
gvr
vcw
gvr
vc
+−
−+
=
+−
−
 
 
Further we assume the goodwill costs are 0 and we take the equation mr ccc +=  into account. 
The wholesale-price has to be 
 
                                                                                                                                        
33
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 238. 
34
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 237. 
35
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 238. 
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s
rmr
r
cw
vcvccw
vcvcw
=
+−−+=
+−−=
 (5)36 
 
to get the optimal quantity oq . 
In other words, if the manufacturer equates the wholesale-price with his costs he would make 
no profit but the supply chain would be efficient in reference to the optimal order quantity. 
The retailer would order the quantity oq  if the scw = . 
If the wholesale-price is greater than the supplier’s costs we have the problem of “double 
marginalization” (Spengler 1950) resulting in the non-optimal order quantity. 
To answer further questions regarding the supply chain performance we have to determine the 
supply chain efficiency in mathematical terms. As already mentioned in the introduction the 
development of coordinating contracts is the key to receive the optimal order quantity. 
The supply chain efficiency can be calculated as follows:37 
 
Π
+ mr pipi
 = the degree of supply chain performance. (6) 
 
The term mr pipi +  is the sum of the profits in the sequential supply chain game with the non-
optimal order chosen by the retailer.38 The term Π  is the total profit in an integrated supply 
chain, where the retailer and the manufacturer build one company without inefficiency. The 
wholesale-price contract would never achieve a supply chain efficiency of 1. Only in the case 
where the manufacturer makes no profit and sets the wholesale-price to his costs the supply 
chain would be efficient. 
A very interesting fact in this context is the demand property of stochastic demand and their 
positive impact on supply chain efficiency without having a coordination mechanism. It could 
be the situation that a wholesale-price contract could be better in profit realization as other 
coordinating contracts having the goal to generate higher supply chain efficiency. Why? The 
reason is the administrative burden caused by the coordinating contracts. In some situations 
the supply chain would be better off having a wholesale-price contract as having a coordina-
tion contract with an administrative burden, which reduces the supply chain performance.39 
                                            
36
 For another mathematical illustration see Cachon, G. P., p. 238. 
37
 See Cachon, G. P., p. 240. 
38
 See Figure 1, p. 4. 
39
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), pp. 296-300. 
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In the next subchapters we will discuss the demand distribution property of a power function, 
the shape of a marginal revenue curve (convexity or concavity) and its consequences to the 
supply chain performance with a wholesale-price contract. Therefore, we will ascertain if in 
specific situations it would be better to have a price-only contract in contrast to other coordi-
nation mechanisms. 
 
2.4 Demand distribution property of a power function and its conse-
quences to supply chain performance.40 
 
The following example was taken from the working paper of Cachon (2003) and shall demon-
strate the efficiency of the wholesale-price contract where demand follows a power function 
distribution.41 
We formulate the following power function distribution F(q) with its density function f(q): 
kqqF =)(  
)1()( −= kkqqf .42 
)()(1)( ′=−= qSqFqF  
Expected sales are: 
∫+−=
q
dyfyyqFqqS
0
)())(1()( . 
The manufacturers profit function is: 
))(()())(,( qSgqcqqwqwq mmm −−−= µpi . 
The manufacturer determines )(qw  dependent on *rq  and can be written as: 
)()()()( vcqFgvrqw rr −−+−= 43 
)(
)()()( *
r
r
r gvr
vcw
qSqF
+−
−+
=′= . 
For further study we have to determine efficiency measures for the wholesale-price under 
consideration of the power function distribution:44 
                                            
40
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), pp. 297-301. 
41
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), pp. 240-241 and Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), pp. 298-299. 
42
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 240 and Bagnoli, M., Bergstrom, T. (1989), p. 10. 
43
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 238. 
44
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 240 and for further study Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L (2001), pp. 298-300. 
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)(
))(,(
*
**
m
mmm
q
qwq
Π
pi
 = 
2
1
+
+
k
k
 = the degree of the manufacturers profit share to the decentralized 
total supply chain profit and 
)(
)(
0
*
q
qm
Π
Π
 = 
kk
k
11)1(
2
+
+
+
 = efficiency of the wholesale price contract. 
Hence, the manufacturer calculates the optimal quantity *mq  to induce )( *mqw  from his profit 
function ))(,( qwqmpi  by differentiating to q. 
Assuming that )1,0(εq  and k>0 45 we are calculating the efficiency for the wholesale price 
contract (=total profit of the decentralized supply chain divided by the total profit of the inte-
grated supply chain) and the profit share of the manufacturer. 
The following graph shows these results: 
 
 
Graph 146 
 
As can be seen by Graph 1, the efficiency of the wholesale-price contract is increasing with 
increasing distribution parameter k and with decreasing “relative variability”47. As relative 
variability falls the manufacturer gets the highest portion of the total decentralized supply 
chain profit.  
In a situation with a high distribution parameter k it is more difficult to implement a coordina-
tion contract with consideration of the additional administrative burden. 
                                            
45
 See Bagnoli, M., Bergstrom, T. (1989), p. 10. 
46
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), p. 299. 
47
 See Lariviere, M. A., Porteus, E. L. (2001), p. 294. They define “relative variability” as the measure of the  
    coefficient of variation (=standard deviation divided by the mean). 
0%
50%
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0 2 4 6 8 10
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Efficiency
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The rational explanation for the decreasing relative variability is the fact that the retailer has 
less demand risk. Hence, the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale-price and the compensa-
tion for the retailer is small. Assuming that the coefficient of variation would be 1 the supply 
chain efficiency would be 100% and the retailer would earn zero profit. 
Hence, the gap between the decentralized and the integrated supply chain profit depends on 
the distribution parameter k. The smaller the more difficult it is to implement a coordination 
contract with respect to its administrative burden. 
The next chapter gives an insight into the shape of a marginal revenue curve (convexity or 
concavity) and its consequences to the supply chain performance with a wholesale-price con-
tract.48 In our study we will observe that the shape of a marginal revenue curve plays also an 
important role for the supply chain performance. If the marginal revenue curve is concave 
then a positive influence on the degree of efficiency can be noted. Hence, it is more difficult 
to implement a coordination contract in reference to the administrative burden. 
 
2.5 The shape of a marginal revenue curve and its consequences to 
the supply chain performance49 
 
We assume the following points: 
• The goodwill costs and the salvage value are zero. 
• The marginal revenue curve is θqqR −=′ 1)( , where 0>θ  and [ ]1,0εq .50 
• A function in the form of )´()( qRqw =  exists to induce the optimal order quantity51 
• The supply chain inefficiency is expressed by λ . 
The first order condition of the suppliers profit function can be determined as follows: 
 
cqqRqR
cqwq
s
s
−
′′+′=′
−=
)()(
))((
pi
pi
52
 
 
Because of the fact that the wholesale price is equal to the marginal revenue the optimal 
wholesale price can be determined as follows: 
                                            
48
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 40. 
49
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), pp. 38-41. 
50
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 39. 
51
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 38. 
52
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 38. 
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)()(
)()(
)()(0
***
**
***
′′
−=
=′
−
′′+′=
sss
ss
sss
qRqcqw
qwqR
cqRqqR
53
 
 
For further study in reference to the supply chain efficiency we have to determine the optimal 
quantity both for the decentralized and centralized situation. 
 






+
−
=
−=+
−−−=
−−+−=
−
′′+′=
−
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θθ
θθ
θθ
1
1
1
10
)()1(0
)()(0
1
***
cq
cqq
cqq
cqqq
cqRqqR sss
 
θ
θ
1
*
1
1






+
−
=
cqs  < θ
1
)1( cq o −= , as cqR o =′)( .54 
 
If we compare the two results it can be seen that the ordered quantity under a wholesale-price 
contract differs from the optimal quantity in an integrated supply chain. Hence, we are faced 
with the problem of supply chain inefficiency. 
Cachon and Lariviere (2005) used the following graphs to show that the shape of a marginal 
revenue curve plays an important role in the improvement of the efficiency. 
                                            
53
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 38. 
54
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 39. 
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Graph 255 
 
 
Graph 356 
 
How it is possible to measure the supply chain inefficiency λ of the two cases? The area right 
and above the red dashed line can be seen as the inefficiency. It results from the non-optimal 
                                            
55
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 39, whereby
4
1
=θ . 
56
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 39, whereby 10=θ . 
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order quantity *sq . Hence, the amount of lost profit in the case of a decentralized system can 
be measured as follows: 
 
∫ −
o
s
q
q
dqcqR
*
))´(( 57
 
 
Additional the following can be noted: 
• If 1<θ  the marginal revenue curve is convex, 
• If 1=θ  it is linear and 
• if 1>θ  it is concave. 
 
For further understanding we add to our model two additional notations: convexqR )( ′  and 
concaveqR )( ′ . 
Now it is possible to calculate the degree of inefficiency if 1>θ : 
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if 1<θ : 
 
∫
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0
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If we compare the two results we can note that convexconcave λλ < .With concavity of the marginal 
revenue curve the degree of inefficiency decreases. Hence, the supply chain is more efficient 
in the case of concavity. These results illustrates that if the marginal revenue curve is concave 
it is more difficult to implement a coordination mechanism with an administrative burden. 
 
                                            
57
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p 39. 
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2.6 Summary 
 
The outcome is that in specific situations the wholesale-price contract would be better off in 
contrast to coordinating contracts in relation to their administrative burden they cause. Expli-
citly, specific demand distribution properties or the shape of a marginal revenue curve com-
plicates the implementation of coordination arraignments into a supply chain. 
Further, we have ascertained that the wholesale-price contract cannot be seen as a coordina-
tion tool but its implications are important for further research. 
The next chapter gives an insight into the first contract in which the manufacturer and the 
retailer shares the revenue to increase the supply chain quantity and consequently to increase 
efficiency. 
 
3. The revenue-sharing contract 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In response to the supply chain inefficiency Cachon and Lariviere (2005) have examined the 
revenue sharing contract. It was already known and implemented by companies such as 
Blockbusters Inc. 
Blockbuster Inc. is a company that offers the possibility to rent or buy cinema films. They are 
present around the world with over 2600 businesses engaged in the rental and selling of home 
entertainment.58 Their success story has begun in 1998, where they have entered into a reve-
nue-sharing contract with their suppliers. Before 1998 Blockbusters faced the problem of cus-
tomer dissatisfaction. They had an insufficient quantity of video cassettes for rental in store 
because the purchase-price or wholesale-price was too high. As a consequence Blockbuster 
Inc. agreed to pay its suppliers between 30% and 45% of its profits. In return the suppliers 
have reduced the wholesale-price for a video tape from $65 to $8. Despite of the fact that 
Blockbuster has given a large share of its profits to suppliers their profits increased after 1998 
                                            
58
 http://www.blockbuster.com/corporate/internationalOperations. 
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dramatically. Their market share increased from 25% to 31% and the cash-flow increased by 
61%.59 
Hence, with a revenue-sharing contract it is possible to increase the ordered quantity and con-
sequently the supply chain performance. 
The question arises whether it is possible to implement this type of coordination mechanism 
in every industry or not? Cachon and Lariviere (2005) have identified three restrictions of 
implementing revenue-sharing contracts as coordination mechanism.60 
The first and most important restriction is the administrative burden. The supplier must have 
an insight to verify and control his share of profit, which is linked with effort and costs. 
The second restriction would be in the case of retailer effort. The retailer enhances demand by 
investing in advertising and promotion. In this case the question arises, up to which extent the 
supplier bears the costs. This situation would lead in a higher administrative burden and the 
coordination contract would not be better off compared to the classical wholesale-price con-
tract. And third, in a price-setting newsvendor model (the retail price is not stated exogenous-
ly) with quantity competing retailers (also known as “Cournot competition”61) in the form of 
an oligopoly the revenue-sharing contract doesn`t work. The retailer is faced with the profit 
function contingent on price, quantity and the profits of the other retailers. Hence, the reve-
nue-sharing contract does not work in an oligopoly.62 Only in the case of perfect competition 
the revenue-sharing contract can be used as coordination mechanism.63 
In the next section we get to the bottom of the question how the revenue-sharing contract 
works and how it is possible to increase the overall supply chain performance? And how 
much the retailer orders if he is confronted with additional effort costs? For example: He in-
vests in promotion and advertising to enhance consumer demand. Therefore, is it possible to 
generate the optimal order quantity as in the case of an integrated supply chain? If yes, which 
value the corresponding contractual parameters would have? Therefore we are first defining 
the model. 
  
                                            
59
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 30 and  
    http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=258. 
60
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 31. 
61
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cournot_competition. 
62
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), pp.36-38. 
63
 See Dana, J. D., Spier, K. E. (2001). 
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3.2 The model64 
 
For further study we take the notation and variables as determined in the previous model. We 
augment our model by the variable )1( φ−  being the portion of revenue the retailer has to pay 
to the manufacturer. Hence, φ  [0, 1] is the portion of revenue the retailer keeps for himself. 
We assume the same timeline for the interactions between the manufacturer and the retailer as 
defined in figure 1. The retailers profit function resulting from the additional contractual 
agreement in reference to φ  can be determined from the formula defined in (1): 
 
µpi
µpi
pi
rrrr
rrr
rrr
gqvcwqSgvrwq
qSqvqSgqcwqqrSwq
qvIqLgqcwqqrSwq
−−+−+−=
−+−−−−=
+−−−=
)()())((),(
))(())(()(),(
)()()(),(
 
 
 
We define the term )()( qSvr −  as the revenue dependent on quantity and retail price and re-
ceive the following profit function: 
 
))(()(),(),,(
)()())((),,(
qSgqvcwrqRwq
gqvcwqSgvrwq
rrr
rrrr
−−−+−=
−−+−+−=
µφφφpi
µφφφpi
.(7) 65 
 
The manufacturers profit function can be determined in the same way and can be defined as 
follows: 
 
))(())1((),()1(),,(
))(())1(())())(1((),,(
qSgqvwcrqRwq
qSgqvwcqSvrwq
mmm
mmm
−−−−−−−=
−−−−−−−−=
µφφφpi
µφφφpi (8)66 
 
If 1=φ the profit functions (7) and (8) correspond to a normal wholesale-price contract. The 
term vq  has to be seen as part of the revenue. Hence, the retailer has the contractual obliga-
tion to pay the manufacturer vq)1( φ− . 
In the next subchapter we are discussing the results from a revenue-sharing contract and its 
impact on supply chain performance. 
 
                                            
64
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), pp. 246-247 and Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 32. 
65
 See Cachon, G.P. (2003), p. 246. 
66
 See Cachon, G.P. (2003), p. 246. 
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3.3 Revenue-sharing contract and its consequences to supply chain 
performance67 
 
What is the optimal wholesale-price in a revenue-sharing contract to receive the optimal quan-
tity )( 0q like in an integrated supply chain? 
We know from the wholesale-price contract that the manufacturer has to set the wholesale-
price to his costs )( mcw =  to receive the optimal order quantity. But in this situation he 
would make no profit. 
To answer the question we have to differentiate formula (7) with respect to q: 
 
)()())((),,( * vcwqSgvr
q
wq
rr
r φφφpi −+−′+−=
∂
∂
 
 
From the above differentiation we can determine the quantity chosen by the retailer under a 
revenue-sharing contract: 
 
r
r
gvr
vcw
qS
+−
−+
=′ )()(
*
φ
φ
. (9) 
 
If we assume for clearer understanding that the goodwill costs and the salvage value are zero 
and compare the results to that of a wholesale-price contract the following can be stated: 
 
r
cwqS rφ
+
=′)( *
 > 
r
cw
qS rr
+
=′)( * . 
 
Hence, the retailer orders under a revenue-sharing contract more as in the case of a price-only 
contract. Therefore, the revenue-sharing contract increases the efficiency of the supply chain 
and consequently the total supply chain performance. 
For further calculating we assume that the goodwill costs are zero and the total costs are
)( mr cc + . In the next step the optimal quantity calculated from an integrated channel ( )( ′oqS
) set to be equal to )( * ′qS : 
                                            
67
 For detail mathematical analysis see Cachon, G. P. (2003), pp. 246-248 and Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A.  
    (2005), pp. 32-36 
  
To obtain the optimal quantity (
the formula (10). 
For further understanding the following graph
wholesale-price below his costs to achieve coordination.
 
 
The wholesale-price would be negative when
the manufacturer has to pay for making business with the retailer.
This result also shows that the manufacturer has to set his wholesale
achieve coordination. Hence, the manufacturer sells the ordered quantity at a loss but he is 
entitled to get his fraction from the revenue made by the retailer.
As can be seen by formula (9) 
quantity expressed in the formula 
 
                                            
68
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 33
69
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 33
70
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 42
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rccw −= φ  (10). 68 
)0q  the manufacturer has to set his wholesale
 shows that the manufacturer has to set his 
 
Graph 4 
c
cr<φ 69
 and would be in the situation in which 
 
-price under his costs to 
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the revenue-sharing contract is closer to the optimal order 
(4). 
. 
. 
. 
-price equal to 
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3.4 Effort costs and their consequences to revenue-sharing71 
 
Promotion, advertising, price discounts, samples and vouchers are connected with additional 
costs ( )(ec ) but they enhance consumer demand.72 It would be unfair if the retailer would 
have to bear all the costs. In that case the retailers total costs increase and his profit share de-
creases. Whereby the manufacturers profit share remains unaffected negatively. He will profit 
from such a case. Thus, in respect to fairness an additional contractual agreement would be 
necessary but that would be linked with additional administrative expenses. And, how much 
of the sales can be allocated to the effort costs. 
For now, by the additional effort costs demand and revenue increases and the manufacturer 
gets more without a contribution to effort costs and the question arises under which conditions 
the retailer orders optimal. Therefore, we have to consider the integrated profit function and 
the retailers profit function to say more. 
The integrated profit function dependent on the quantity and the effort level differentiated 
with respect to e is:  
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∂
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eq 73
 and 
 
the profit of the retailer differentiated with respect to e  is: 
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∂
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=
∂
∂
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e
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e
eqr φpi 74. 
 
The retailer would only order optimal if 1=φ . In this case the manufacturer would earn noth-
ing because he would have to equate the wholesale-price with his costs ( mcw = ) to induce the 
optimal order quantity. 
Voluntary contribution and transparency would solve the problem. The manufacturer shares 
the effort costs with the retailer, which is called “effort sharing”.75 Cost sharing is possible if 
effort costs and demand are determinable, whereby demand further has to be observable.76 
                                            
71
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 41. 
72
 See Krishnan, H., Kapuscinski, R., Butz, D. A. (2004), p. 51. 
73
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 41. 
74
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 41. 
75
 See Krishnan, H., Kapuscinski, R., Butz, D. A. (2004), p. 56. 
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3.5 Summary 
 
Revenue-sharing increases the order quantity and induces a better supply chain performance. 
Therefore, the manufacturer has to set his price below his costs to achieve coordination. 
Effort costs which are spent to increase consumer demand needs to be fairly shared so that 
nobody in the supply chain gets worse off. 
  
                                                                                                                                        
76
 See Krishnan, H., Kapuscinski, R., Butz, D. A. (2004), p. 55. 
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4. The buyback contract77 
 
In the following chapter we will discuss the buyback contract and their consequences to the 
supply chain performance. We will assess that this type of contract can be seen as a coordina-
tion mechanism and we will see that a buyback contract does not differ from a revenue-
sharing contract in the fixed-price newsvendor model under certain assumptions. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This form of contract is often observed in business. The publishers of journals, magazines and 
periodicals offer the contractual agreed possibility to buy back the unsold goods one day, 
week or month later. By such a contractual agreement the supplier has the intention to in-
crease the ordered quantity to the optimal order quantity. This procedure reduces the retailer’s 
risk of making a loss if he orders too much. 
In specific contractual agreements the supplier and the retailer bears the risk of unsold goods, 
which leads to a better supply chain performance. In the study of Pasternack (1985) three dif-
ferent contractual agreements are presented to coordinate the supply chain, whereby one of 
them induces the optimal order quantity both in the single-retailer environment and in the 
multi-retailer environment.78 
The first contractual agreement contains the clause that the manufacturer is obligated to buy 
back all unsold goods at full value. This clause leads to a full shift of risk to the supplier or 
manufacturer, whereas the retailer has no risk. Consequently he would order suboptimal. The 
second contractual agreement allows the retailer to return a percentage of bought goods at full 
value. To receive system optimality it can be adapted to a single-retailer environment but not 
to a multi-retailer environment. In the third contractual agreement the retailer has the possibil-
ity to return all unsold goods at partial value. This arrangement can be adapted to the single 
and multi-retailer environment.79 
A further interesting fact is the similarity of the buyback contract to the revenue-sharing con-
tract in the fixed-price newsvendor model. In a fixed-price market with a buyback agreement 
it is possible to calculate contractual terms, which are inducing the same solution as in the 
                                            
77
 In the style of Cachon, G. P. (2003), pp. 242-246 and Pasternack, B. A. (1985), pp. 133-140. 
78
 See Pasternack, B. A. (1985), p. 135. 
79
 See Pasternack, B. A. (1985), pp. 135-137. 
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case of a revenue-sharing contract.80 In contrast with a price-setting market, coordination is 
only achieved by the fact that the supplier or manufacturer makes no profit.81 
A buy-back contract could also cause an administrative burden. An example could be if the 
manufacturer has to check and monitor the leftover inventory which would imply higher 
costs. Hence, the additional costs reduce the total supply chain performance.82 As a conse-
quence it could be difficult in certain circumstances to implement a buy-back contract where 
the gap between the additional profits is closer to the administrative burden. In such a case it 
could be better to have a price-only contract. 
After having introduced some basic concepts concerning the buyback contract we consequent-
ly define the model for a buy-back contract. Then we calculate the order quantity under the 
different contractual agreements to have a deeper insight into the supply chain performance. 
We will assess that there are four different possibilities to design a buy-back contract, where-
by three of them can be used for supply chain coordination. 
Finally, we calculate the contractual terms, which are inducing the same profit realization as 
under the revenue-sharing contract in the fixed-price newsvendor model. In other words, we 
are looking for the contractual parameters of a buy-back contract which are inducing the same 
result as in the case of revenue-sharing. 
 
4.2 The model 
 
We assume a fixed-price newsvendor model in a single-retailer environment with stochastic 
demand. The interactions as mentioned in figure 1 takes place. We extend our model by the 
term R . R  stands for the percentage of leftover inventory which can be returned by the re-
tailer after the season. The retailer receives the value b  per unit returned.83 
We distinguish between 5 scenarios or contractual agreements to analyze supply chain per-
formance:84 
 
1. no buy-back ( 0=R  and 0=b ), 
2. total buy-back at full value ( 1=R  and wb = ), 
3. total buy-back at partial value ( 1=R  and wbv << ), 
                                            
80
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), pp. 33-34. 
81
 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 34. 
82
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), pp. 242-243. 
83
 See Pasternack, B. A. (1985), p. 135 and Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 242. 
84
 See Pasternack, B. A. (1985), pp.133-135. 
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4. partial buy-back at full value ( [ ]1,0=R  and wb = ) and 
5. partial buy-back at partial value ( [ ]1,0=R  and )wbv << . 
 
The solution of the first contractual agreement would be the same as in the case of a whole-
sale-price contract. 
In the second scenario, where the manufacturer buys all goods of leftover inventory from the 
retailer at full value cannot be considered as optimal.85 In this case the manufacturer would 
bear all the risk of unsold goods. The retailer would not have the incentive to order optimal. 
Demand forecast costs money and so he would order more rather than having too less on 
stock.86 
The third, fourth and fifth policy can be seen as optimal for further calculation. Therefore, we 
will discuss in the next chapter the third, fourth and fifth policy in detail. 
 
4.3 Buyback contract and its consequences to supply chain perfor-
mance87 
 
We do not assume the situation where the goodwill costs are zero. As can be shown by the 
interactions (Figure 1) the manufacturer and the retailer do not know consumer demand in 
advance. And so the manufacturer has to take into account for further calculation also the sit-
uation that there are expected lost sales. We also do not assume that the salvage value is zero. 
The retailers profit with a buy-back agreement in general can be shown as follows: 
 
))()(1())(()()()( qSqRvqSqbRqLgqcwqqrSq rrr −−+−+−−−=pi . 
))1())((()()()( RvbRqSqqLgqcwqqrSq rrr −+−+−−−=pi  
 
Now we investigate the third contractual agreement where the manufacturer buys the remain-
ing of ordered quantity back at partial value. In this situation 1=R  and wbv << . Hence, the 
retailer is faced with the following profit function: 
                                            
85
 See Pasternack, B. A. (1985), p. 137. 
86
 „For example, as reported in the February 18, 1982 issue of the Wall Street Journal, record manufacturers  
    had been allowing full credit for all unsold goods records by retailers. The article went on to report that 
    recent policy changes by a number of manufacturers have limited the amount of returns for full credit to  
   around 20%” (Pasternack, B. A. 1985, p. 134). 
87
 For detail mathematical calculation see Pasternack, B. A. (1985), pp. 133-140 and Cachon, G. P. (2003), pp.  
    242-246. 
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))(()()()( 3 qSqbqLgqcwqqrSq rrbuybackr −+−−−=pi  
 
We now differentiate the above profit function to q and receive: 
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It can be proven that the above formula is closer to )( ′oqS  as formula (4) being the solution 
in the case of price-only contract. Hence, we can assess the following solution with respect to
)( * ′qS : 
 
pricewholesalerbuybackregrated qSqSqS −′<′<′ )()()( **int* 3 . 
Order quantity from 
r
r
buybackr gbr
bcw
qS
+−
−+
=′ 3)( *  > as the order quantity from
r
r
r gvr
vcw
qS
+−
−+
=′)( * .89 
 
Hence, it is possible to induce a better supply chain performance with the buyback contract 
under the third contractual agreement because vb > . 
Now, we look at the fourth contractual agreement where the manufacturer buys at full value a 
portion of unsold goods back. The retailers profit function in this case is: 
 
))()(1())(()()()( 4 qSqRvqSqwRqLgqcwqqrSq rrbuybackr −−+−+−−−=pi . 
 
The manufacturer buys the portion of unsold goods at the wholesale-price back and the retail-
er sells the remainder at the salvage value. The first derivative of the retailers profit function 
with respect to q is: 
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 For detail mathematical analysis see Pasternack, B. A. (1985), pp. 135-138. 
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 Supply chain efficiency increases, see graph 6, p. 31. 
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Proof: We assume that 0=R . Hence, 
vgr
vwc
qS
r
r
buybackr
−+
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=′ 4)( * induces the solution under a 
wholesale-price contract. 
Finally, the retailers profit under the fifth contractual agreement would be 
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and the first derivative with respect to q is 
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Proof: We assume that 0=R  and vb = . Therefore,
vgr
vcw
qS
r
r
buybackr
−+
−+
=′ 5)( * . The same solu-
tion as in the case of a price-only contract would be induced. 
In the next subchapter we will analyze the solutions based on a graphical illustration. We will 
compare the first derivative of the expected sales of the wholesale-price contract with that of 
the different contractual agreements under a buyback contract. We will assess that a buyback 
buy-back contract induces a better performance as in the case of a price-only contract. 
 
4.4 Graphical illustration of the three contractual agreements92 
 
We assume the following information’s: 
 
Retail price………………………..12 
Retailer’s costs……………………5 
Retailer’s goodwill costs………….2 
Salvage value……………………..2 
Wholesale-price……………….…..5 
Manufacturer’s costs……………...3 
                                                                                                                                        
90
 For detail mathematical analysis see Pasternack, B. A. (1985), p. 136. 
91
 For detail mathematical analysis see Pasternack, B. A. (1985), p.136. 
92
 Regarding to the illustration of the five contractual agreements see Pasternack, B. A. (1985), p. 138. 
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Manufacturer’s goodwill costs……2 
Buy-back value……………………3.5 
 
The retailers and the manufacturer’s goodwill costs are calculated by lost profits. We assume 
that the buyback value is the mean of the salvage value and the wholesale-price (for the third 
and fifth contractual agreement) and plays an important role in calculating the solution for the 
fifth contractual agreement. 
The first graph shows the derived expected sales as a function of the buy-back rate. 
 
 
Graph 5 
 
Graph 5 indicates that the two contractual agreements improve the performance of the total 
supply chain. The higher the buyback rate the closer is the supply chain performance to that of 
an integrated supply chain. With this contractual agreement it is possible to augment the order 
quantity but it is not possible to induce the integrated supply chain quantity. 
The fourth contractual agreement induces a better performance than the fifth contractual 
agreement as long as the buyback value is between the salvage value and the wholesale-price 
( wbv << ). On condition that wb =  the following result would be induced:
45 )()( ** buybackrbuybackr qSqS ′=′ . Hence, the buy-back contract with these two contractual agree-
ments can be seen as a coordination mechanism. 
The second graph shows the solution of the third contractual agreement. 
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Graph 6 
 
Graph 6 indicates also an improvement of the performance. Hence, the third contractual 
agreement can also be seen as a coordination mechanism. 
If we compare the two graphs with each other we recognize that the best performance is in-
duced by the fourth contractual agreement, which corresponds with economic practice (re-
ported in the Wall Street Journal, February 18, 1982: “Record manufacturers had been allow-
ing full credit for all unsold records by retailers. The article went on to report that recent 
policy changes by a number of manufacturers have limited the amount of returns for full cre-
dit to around 20%”93). 
In the next chapter we will see that the buy-back contract is similar to the revenue-sharing 
contract under certain assumptions. Therefore, we will calculate the contractual terms of a 
buy-back contract inducing the same optimal solution. We are looking for [ ]bwb,  correspond-
ing to [ ]rw,φ . 
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4.5 The similarity of the third contractual agreement to a revenue-
sharing contract94 
 
As we have defined the same assumptions for the two coordination mechanisms it is possible 
to confront the retailers profit functions with each other. By way of illustration we compare 
the retailers profit function with the third contractual agreement with the retailers profit func-
tion under the revenue sharing-contract. 
 
µpi rrbrbuybackr gbcwqgbrqS −−+−+−= )()))(((3  
µφφpi rrrrsharingrevenuer gvcwqgvrqS −−+−+−=− )())()((  
 
From the above profit functions we calculate [ ]bwb,  by equation and substitute rw by rcc −φ 95 
and receive the buy-back rate and the wholesale-price, which are inducing the same profit 
realizations as in the case of a revenue-sharing contract: 
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The buy-back rate is dependent on the retail price. Hence, this model works only with a fixed-
price newsvendor.98 
The calculation of the contractual parameters in a price-setting newsvendor model would only 
be possible if the manufacturer publishes the above contractual terms. Whereby the buy-back 
rate and the wholesale-price must be dependent on the retail price:99 
 
)()( vrrrb −−= φ  
bcvcrw rb +−−= )()( φ . 
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 For detail mathematical analysis see Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), pp. 33-34. 
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 See formula 10, p. 20. 
96
 Compare with Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 33 for another result. 
97
 Compare with Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 34 for another result. 
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 See Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A. (2005), p. 33. 
99
 For details see Cachon, G. P., Lariviere, M. A (2005), p. 34. 
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4.6 Summary 
 
We have ascertained that it is possible to induce the same supply chain performance as in the 
case of a revenue-sharing contract. Further, we have stated that the fourth contractual agree-
ment has the best performance by contrast with the two others. The graphical illustration cor-
responds to the economic practice as published by the Wall Street Journal. 
The buy-back contract can be used to induce a better performance. Hence, a buy-back con-
tract coordinates a supply chain. 
5. The sales-rebate contract100 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The idea behind the sales-rebate contract is that the manufacturer gives the retailer an incen-
tive to order more. The consequences should be clear. The retailer orders more and the total 
supply chain profits should increase. 
We can distinguish between two contract forms: A “linear-rebate” contract, in which the 
manufacturer is obligated to give a price deduction on every unit sold to end consumer and a 
“target-rebate” contract, in which the manufacturer is obligated to give a price deduction 
only after a specific amount of goods were sold.101 In the latter case the bilateral agreement 
involves a threshold and a discount rate. 
Hewlett Packard (HP) has introduced a reward system for resellers. A registered company 
gets between 1% and 5% in cash of their sales back, which is credited on its account. The 
credited money can be spent again in further HP products.102 
In 2008 HP has established the “gold-partnership” program. The “gold-partners” work closely 
with HP. They have stood out from other companies by strict compliance of HP guidelines 
                                            
100
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and trainings.103 For the gold-partners HP has developed a mixed reward system consisting of 
a linear and target-rebate scheme.104 
In the United States over 400 million rebate schemes are offered with a total volume of $6 
billion every year.105 Cho, McCardle and Tang (2009) have brought up an interesting question 
in this context. Why companies do not launch short price reductions instead of rebate pro-
grams? In their scientific paper they advanced two interesting arguments:106 
 
1. In the case of a price reduction consumers often apply a “wait and see” strategy. As a 
result turnover is lost temporarily. 
2. Rebate schemes can be more profitable in the sense that consumers often forget to 
claim rebates. According to Cho, McCardle and Tang (2009) 40% of total granted re-
bates are un-cashed. 
 
In their paper they also brought two negative effects of rebate schemes in:107 
 
1. Temporary price reductions seem more attractive as rebate schemes. The reason lay in 
the fact that for consumers it is more stressful to redeem a rebate as compared with a 
price-reduction. 
2. Companies have to advertise and promote their rebate policy, which is connected with 
additional costs. 
 
In our case rebates and price reductions cannot be compared with each other because rebates 
are cashed only in the case of sales realization.108 
Also in the case of time horizons in which channel rebates are granted has to be differentiated. 
Channel rebates can be granted without a time limitation as in the example of HP or with a 
time restriction. In our model the time restrictions does not play an important role because we 
have assumed a one-period model.109 
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Taylor (2002) has also studied the impact on sales effort on coordination. He found out that if 
sales effort has no impact on demand a target-rebate policy coordinates the channel. In this 
context a better supply chain performance cannot be reached by a linear-rebate policy.110 
The rebate policy has also to be distinguished from a quantity discount policy. In the latter 
case the discount depends on the amount of goods being purchased by the retailer instead of 
realized sales.111 
According to supply channel coordination the sales-rebate contract can induce the same result 
as in the case of a revenue-sharing contract. Therefore, it is possible to calculate specific 
sales-rebate parameters which induce equal results. But it must be mentioned that the sales-
rebate contract only induces the same performance in which the retailer is not a price-taker. 
The retail price is endogenously defined by the retailer. He can be seen as a price-setting 
newsvendor.112 
Hence, different policies can be examined if they are achieving channel coordination. And so, 
we can distinguish between the following schemes:113 
 
1. A target-rebate policy, and 
2. a linear-rebate policy. 
 
We will see that the two coordination mechanisms induce a better supply chain performance 
and that it is not always possible to induce a win-win-situation (both the manufacturer and the 
retailer are not worse-off).114 
We will further see that a linear-rebate policy induces a better performance in contrast to the 
target-rebate policy without the assumption of win-win and under specific contractual agree-
ments. 
 
5.2 The model 
 
Based on the assumption being already defined we further assume that the retailer cannot de-
cide about the retail price. He is a price taker. In economic practice the retailers has often the 
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obligation to comply with a given price. Such standards defined by manufacturers are called 
as RPM (“resale price maintenance”) and MAP-policies (“minimum advertised price”).115 
We assume further that the salvage value could be negative. This circumstance occurs if the 
retailer or the manufacturer has to dispose of leftover inventory.116 The granted rebate is ex-
pressed by the term α  ( [ ]1,0αε ) and the threshold is expressed by the termT . 
We will also examine the impact of mixed strategies to supply chain performance as in the 
case of HP, whereby the rebates are paid only in the case of sales realization. But first of all, 
we will study the target and linear rebate policy in detail. 
 
5.3 The target-rebate policy and its consequences to supply chain 
performance117 
 
The retailers profit function under a target-rebate policy if Tsales realized > can be written as: 
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As contrasted with Cachon (2003) the retailer receives a rebate payment in the amount of 
wqα  (α  is declared as percentage) minus the rebate payment to the threshold and the units 
unsold. 
The retailer receives only a rebate payment for units sold. For units unsold he receives a sal-
vage value per unit. In our analysis units unsold are expressed by the term )()( qSqqI −=  
(=leftover inventory). We further assume that qT β= , as Tq > . In detail, the manufacturer 
grants a rebate on the amount of α % above %β  of unit’s ordered. Hence, the retailers profit 
function can also be expressed as follows: 
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Hence, the retailer receives a total rebate payment for all units ordered minus the threshold 
and leftover inventory for which he has no claim. 
In the situation in which 1=β  the retailer does not receive a rebate payment due to the fact 
that qT = . On the other side in which 0=β  the retailer receives a payment on all units sold. 
Hence, the solution under linear-rebate policy would be induced.119 
The same applies to the situation in which 0=α . Therefore, in both cases ( 1=β , 0=α ) the 
supply chain performance of a price-only contract would be induced. 
For further analysis we assume the following transfer-payment relating to the target-rebate 
policy: 
 
))((arg qSqwqwwqT rebateett −−−=− αβαα 120.
 
 
The retailer has a claim to a percentage of the wholesale-price times the ordered quantity mi-
nus the threshold and the rebate payment on the leftover-inventory for which he has no claim. 
Consequently, the retailers profit function is: 
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The first derivative of the retailers profit function yields to the following solution: 
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If 0=β  the retailer receives for all units sold a rebate-payment in the amount of wα . In the 
situation in which the manufacturer does not grant a rebate ( 0=α ) the same solution as in the 
case of a price-only contract would be induced. Consequently, if 1=β  and 0=α  the solution 
of a price-only contract would also be induced. 
If we compare the first derivative of expected sales of a price-only contract, a sales rebate 
contract and the solution of the integrated channel we are able to state the following: 
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pricewholesalerrebatesalesregratedr qSqSqS −− ′<′<′ )()()( **int* . 
 
For the graphical illustration we assume the same data as defined in chapter 4.4. We further 
assume that mcw >  and that the rebate α  is between 1% and 45% and β  =40%. 
 
 
Graph 7 
 
Graph 7 indicates that the target-rebate policy enhance the total supply chain performance. 
The manufacturer grants the retailer a price reduction of wα−  for units sold above the thre-
shold, therefore the manufacturers profit decreases and the retailers profit increases with in-
creasingα .121 
The following graph should demonstrate this case: 
                                            
121
 For details see Cachon, G. P. (2003), pp. 253-254 and Taylor, T. A. (2002), pp. 995-999. 
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,00 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50
S
(q
*
)´
α...rebate
The target-rebate policy 
β=40%
S(q*)´target-rebate
S(q*)´integrated
S(q*)´wholesale-price
37 
 
Graph 8122 
 
If the manufacturer wants to induce the integrated supply chain performance and mcw >  he 
has to choose wα  as the difference between wholesale-price and his costs: mcww −=α  and 
as result mcw = . Hence, we have no double marginalization.
123
 The manufacturer makes zero-
profit and the retailer earns the total profit as in the case of an integrated business. 
Now, we examine the manufacturers profit function and assume 0=β  and the goodwill costs 
are zero: 
 
)(qwSqcwq mrebatem αpi −−= .124 
 
The term )(qwSα−  is the rebate-payment on expected sales which the manufacturer has to 
pay to the retailer. The first derivative in respect to q leads to the following solution: 
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We assume mcw >
.
 The manufacturer has to choose the rebate-payment to induce the result of 
an integrated channel as follows: 
 
mcwqwS −=′)(α  
 
In such a situation the manufacturer would earn zero profit and the retailer would earn the 
total profit. Intuitively, as the rebate-payment increases the ratio of the manufacturers profit to 
the total supply chain profit decreases. Hence, the retailer receives with increasing rebate-
payment the partial profit of the manufacturer.126 
In the next subchapter we will examine the linear-rebate policy and will compare it to the tar-
get-rebate policy. 
 
5.4 The linear-rebate policy and its consequences to supply chain 
performance127 
 
The manufacturer pays the retailer a rebate in the amount of wα  per unit sold. Therefore, the 
retailers profit function under a linear-rebate policy can be expressed as follows: 
 
))(())(())(()( qSqwwqqSqvqSgqcwqqrS rrrebatelinearr −−+−+−−−−=− ααµpi  
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Hence, the manufacturer grants a rebate in the amount of all units ordered and sold minus the 
leftover-inventory: 
 
))(( qSqwwqT rebatelinear −−=− αα . 
 
For the correct rebate-payment the manufacturer has to verify the amount of units sold which 
is connected with an administrative burden. Therefore, the question arises if it is worth to en-
ter into a linear-rebate agreement in contrast to a price-only contract. Hence, the manufacturer 
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has to take into account the administrative costs which decrease his expected profit. For now 
we assume that the administrative costs are zero. 
By differentiating the profit function with respect to q and receive: 
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If we compare the results of a target-rebate and a linear-rebate policy the following can be 
stated in relation to the overall channel performance: 
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The linear-rebate policy induces a better result in contrast to the target-rebate policy. Howev-
er, the question arises if the linear contract is implementable.128 Due to the fact that the manu-
facturer grants the retailer a price-reduction on every unit sold it could be the situation in 
which the manufacturer makes a loss or he has no profit. This would be in the case in which 
the margin does not cover the costs: mcww <− )( α . Compared to the target-rebate policy this 
fact is of concern above the threshold. Taylor (2002) has assessed that coordination is possible 
but the manufacturer would incur a loss.129 Also Cachon (2003) faced up to profit allocation 
with a precise analysis. He concludes that it is not possible to implement this type of contract 
to enhance supply chain performance in the case of “voluntary compliance”.130 
The following graph illustrates the consequences of a linear-rebate policy to supply chain per-
formance: 
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Graph 9 
 
Graph 9 and 7 illustrates the above solution.131 In the situation in which 0=α  the linear-
rebate contract induces the same result as the price-only contract. 
Hence, the linear-rebate policy induces a better supply chain performance in contrast to the 
target-linear policy and the wholesale-price contract. But it has been mentioned again that 
under specific contractual parameters the manufacturer would not participate.132 
But it could be a situation in which the manufacturer has a bargaining power whereby the 
manufacturer offers the retailer specific contractual parameters which can be seen as “take-it-
or-leave it” 133 offer. So, the retailer does not reject the contract if his opportunity costs are 
covered. In such a case the retailer would make zero-profit and the manufacturer would re-
ceive the total supply chain profit.134 
In the case of a non-constant wholesale-price (dependent on quantity) a suitable profit sharing 
is possible without that one of the supply chain gets worse off (win-win-situation).135 
Taylor (2002) has also brought up the question if it is possible to induce contractual parame-
ters inducing the same result as in the case of revenue-sharing. He concludes that it is not 
possible:136 
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Since profit of the retailer in a revenue-sharing contract is sharingrevenuewr −−φ  and under a li-
near-rebate policy is rebaterebate wwr −+ α . By equation of the wholesale-prices the rebate-
payment wα  would be negative. Hence, a revenue-sharing contract differs from a linear-
rebate and target-rebate policy. 
In the next chapter we will compare the quantity-discount policy (in which the retailer rece-
ives a rebate payment on each unit purchased) to the linear-rebate policy (in which the retailer 
receives a rebate payment on each unit sold). 
 
5.5 The quantity-discount policy and its consequences to supply 
chain performance137 
 
The retailers profit function under a quantity-discount agreement would be: 
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The retailer receives for every unit purchased a rebate payment in the amount of wα . The first 
derivative of the retailers profit function is 
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The following graph should demonstrate the above solution. 
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Graph 10 
 
Hence, the quantity-discount policy enhances the supply chain performance in contrast to the 
linear-rebate policy. It is also possible to induce the performance of an integrated channel as 
far as the manufacturer increases the rebate payment to a specific amount. In our case it would 
be in the situation in which the violet line crosses the red line. 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
Receiving a better supply chain performance and thereby insuring that no party gets worse off 
(a situation in which all parties involved in the supply chain make a profit) implies that the 
manufacturer has to know the demand distribution in order to offer the retailer suitable con-
tractual parameters.138 
Hence, linear-rebate and target-rebate policies achieve a better supply chain performance but 
they are not practicable in relation to outcomes. Taylor (2002) have therefore designed a con-
tract in which the retailer can give back unsold goods at an agreed value and receives a target-
rebate for sold goods under the assumption of retailers sales effort. Such a contract is practic-
able and implementable.139 
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6. The quantity-flexibility contract140 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Under a quantity-flexibility contract the manufacturer pays the retailer the losses on unsold 
inventory. In contrast to the buyback contract the manufacturer fully takes on the risks of un-
sold units. Hence, the quantity flexibility contract fully secures the retailer on his order.141 
The question arises if such a policy in the described manner could be effective and will be 
implemented in economic practice. If the retailer gets on the total amount of unsold goods a 
compensation in the amount of his losses he would not bear a risk being resulting in an ineffi-
cient ordering system. 
It has to be noticed that an additional contract parameter must be implemented to avoid the 
described scenario. Hence, under a quantity-flexibility contract only a fraction of unsold in-
ventory is compensated by the manufacturer. 142 
A lot of companies can be named which are using the concept of a quantity-flexibility con-
tract. Examples are Microsystems, Nippon Otis, Solectron, Toyota Motor Corporation, Hew-
lett Packard and Compaq.143 
In the case in which the manufacturer pays the retailer a partial of his losses measured accord-
ing to an agreed fraction of unsold goods we have a special form of a quantity-flexibility con-
tract being studied in the literature extensively. It is called a backup agreement.144 In the re-
search of Eppen and Iyer (1997) the retailer (=catalog-company) communicates the total order 
and orders a part of it at the beginning of the period. After the retailer has observed the first 
demand signal he orders from the backup-quantity. In the case of not ordering the total back-
up-quantity the retailer has to pay a penalty on leftover backup-quantity.145 This procedure is 
applicable in industries with long cycle times, a high percentage of uncertainty, a high degree 
of returned units and the possibility to adapt the number of units.146 
The quantity-flexibility contract was studied intensively by Tsay and Lovejoy (1999). In their 
model they defined a number of processing times, demand periods and demand forecast actu-
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alizations.147 Therefore, to answer our question regarding to supply chain performance and the 
effectiveness regarding to decreasing of the double marginalization effect their complex 
scientific paper is not qualified in that context. 
In this context it has to be mentioned the “rolling-horizon-flexibility contract” (Bassok and 
Anupindi 2008). Under such an agreement the retailer communicates in every period in ad-
vance in every period the needed quantity. After the retailer has recognized a demand signal 
he has the possibility through a contractual agreed percentage to alter his order (e.g. the retail-
er communicates a specified order quantity for period 2 which can be adapted by plus/minus 
10%).148 In their study they give an insight into the characteristics of rolling-horizon-
flexibility contracts regarding to effectiveness through two heuristics.149 
Hence, uncertain demands, the behavior of over forecasting and information asymmetry are 
the main reasons for developing different types of quantity flexibility contracts.150 Effectively 
the retailer has to pay more for more flexibility because of additional inventory carrying costs 
arising at the manufacturer. Therefore, the manufacturer is faced with long production and 
procurement times implying inflexibility and so a higher build-up inventory is necessary to 
meet consumer demand in a short period.151 However, the manufacturer could also agree with 
a lower price per unit in return for more certainty regarding to forecasting.152 
How important a quantity flexibility contract regarding to supply chain performance might be 
can be demonstrated by the following example from economic practice:153 Mattel a supplier 
of toys relied on higher sales after Thanksgiving in the year 1998. However, the retailers 
could not place their orders as expected. As a consequence Mattel incurred a loss in the 
amount of $500 million. Mattel responded to that loss by signing the retailers to place their 
orders before Thanksgiving in order to avoid creating unnecessary stock of inventory. There-
fore, Mattel does not offer flexibility which could lead to supply chain inefficiencies. Mattel 
has not reacted correctly because of the fact that there are possibilities to implement flexibility 
mechanisms decreasing the risk and leading to a win-win situation and therefore to a better 
supply chain performance.154 
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Another type of contract in that context is the pay-to-delay contract which is often used in the 
Semiconductor-industry. The supplier has the possibility to make his order at a later time but 
has to make a prepayment which will replace the procurement costs. 155 
For further analysis and the answer regarding to supply chain efficiency as well as the double-
marginalization effect the scientific paper of Cachon 2003 is qualified best.156 Therefore, we 
define in the next chapter the model under a quantity-flexibility contract with total and partial 
compensation in a one-period model. Afterwards we analyze supply chain performance with 
regard to the double marginalization effect. 
 
6.2 The model 
 
The manufacturer pays the retailer a payment in the amount of  
 
vcwT r −+= .
157
 
 
The retailer receives that payment on his leftover inventory or on a part of his unsold units 
which will be expressed by the term [ ]1,0ωε .158 Therefore, the retailer agrees to the contractual 
terms T  and ω  being specified by the manufacturer.159 
Hence, we can distinguish between the following two contractual agreements: 
 
1. The retailer receives a payment in the amount of T on the total amount of leftover in-
ventory or 
2. the retailer receives a payment in the amount of T on a part of unsold units. 
 
In the first contractual agreement it is important to keep in mind that the supplier gives a 
wrong incentive. In that case the retailer would order without considering consumer demand 
leading to an inefficient supply chain. He would order as much as possible to cover demand 
without punishment to increase his profit. Therefore, for further calculation we take only the 
second contractual agreement. 
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6.3 The quantity-flexibility contract and its consequences to supply 
chain performance 
 
In this chapter we will analyze the supply chain performance under second contractual agree-
ment in detail to assess whether the flexibility contract in the above manner decreases the 
double-marginalization effect and hence coordinates the supply chain. 
The retailers profit function under the second contractual agreement is: 
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The payment under the second contractual agreement takes place only on a fraction of unsold 
goods. 
Hence, from the viewpoint of the manufacturer it is necessary to differentiate the above profit 
function to q to calculate the optimal supply chain units under the quantity-flexibility contract. 
Therefore, the first derivative of the retailers profit function is: 
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If we compare the result under a wholesale-price contract with the above formula we can as-
sess the following: 
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The quantity-flexibility contract in which a portion of the unsold goods underlie a compensa-
tion paid by the manufacturer can be seen as a coordination mechanism. Under the above con-
tractual agreement the retailer would order more and overall supply chain performance would 
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 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 249. 
161
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 249. 
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 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 238. 
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increase. Notice that the manufacturer acts again like a “Stackelberg-leader”. He decides 
about the contract terms and forces the retailer to act under his interests.163 
To show how the quantity-flexibility contract decreases the double-marginalization effect we 
calculate from the first derivative the wholesale-price as a function of the fraction of unsold 
goods and receive: 
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If we compare the above wholesale-price to the wholesale-price calculated from the first de-
rivative under a price-only contract we can assess the following: 
 
yflexibilitquantityrronlyprice wvcqSgvrw −− >+−′+−= )()()( * ω .165 
 
The manufacturer induces the optimal quantity (like in an integrated channel) if he sets his 
costs to the wholesale-price ( scw = ). In this situation the manufacturer would earn zero-profit 
and the retailer would earn the total supply chain profit. 
In the case of a price-only contract in which scw >  we recognize the double-marginalization 
effect. If we compare the wholesale-prices of a price-only contract and a quantity-flexibility 
contract as calculated above we see that the wholesale-price under the price-only agreement is 
higher as the wholesale-price under the quantity-flexibility agreement. Hence, the wholesale-
price as a function of the fraction of unsold goods induces a better supply chain performance 
as in the case of a price-only contract. Therefore, the double-marginalization effect is mini-
mized by the quantity-flexibility agreement. 
In the case in which 0=ω  the solution of a price-only contract will be induced: 
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In the case in which 1=ω  the following result can be recognized: 
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Hence, the wholesale-price under a quantity-flexibility agreement has to be between: 
 
rrr gcrwcv +−≤≤− )(ω .168 
 
6.4 Summary 
 
In this section we can conclude that the quantity-flexibility contract induces a better supply 
chain performance and reduces the double-marginalization effect. 
To which extent the different profit shares are split between the manufacturer and the retailer 
depends on the fraction of unsold goods compensated.169 
  
                                            
167
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 250. 
168
 See Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 250. 
169
 For details see Cachon, G. P. (2003), p. 251. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The revenue-sharing, the buyback, the sales-rebate and the quantity-flexibility contract are 
suitable as coordination mechanisms with the exception of the wholesale-price contract. They 
provide an incentive to the retailer to order more and total supply chain profit increases. With 
increasing supply chain profits the efficiency of the supply chain also increases independent 
of profit allocation. 
In specific cases the supply chain would be better off in contrast to the presented coordination 
arrangements. Because coordinating contracts cause an administrative burden their implemen-
tation would be more difficult in the sense of system efficiency. And consequently, the attrac-
tiveness of the wholesale-price contract increases. Especially in the cases in which demand 
follows a power-function distribution with decreasing relative variability and in the case of 
concavity of marginal revenue curve the degree of supply chain inefficiency decreases.170 
Under a revenue-sharing agreement the manufacturer has to set his wholesale-price below his 
costs to achieve coordination. Effort costs which are spent to increase consumer demand 
needs to be fairly shared so that nobody in the supply chain gets worse off. 
Under a buy-back agreement three possibilities for improving the supply chain were pre-
sented. The agreement in which the manufacturer buys a partial of unsold goods back at full 
value has induced the best performance corresponding with economic practice (reported in the 
Wall Street Journal, February 18, 1982171). Further, the buy-back contract induces the same 
result as in the case of revenue-sharing by equation and substituting. 
We have ascertained that a target-rebate policy reduces the manufacturer’s profit above the 
threshold and increases the retailer’s profit. The linear-rebate policy induces a better supply 
chain performance in contrast to the target-rebate policy but under specific contractual para-
meters the manufacturer would not participate.172 In such a case he would make a loss or zero 
profit. Further a linear-sales rebate contract could never induce the same result as in the case 
of a revenue-sharing contract. 
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Abstract in English 
This paper has a focus on supply chain inefficiency based on the problem of “double margina-
lization” and consequently non-optimal ordering quantity. Well-known scientists have grap-
pled critical with coordinating contracts in a mathematical way to investigate them with re-
spect to total-profit efficiency. On the basis of their intensive research this paper gives the 
answer for how “double-marginalization” arises, which contracts exist in economic practice 
and which of them coordinates the supply chain with regard to increasing total supply chain 
profit. 
Abstract in German 
Der Fokus dieser Diplomarbeit liegt auf dem Problem der “doppelten Marginalisierung” und 
den daraus resultierenden Konsequenzen für die Wertschöpfungskette. 
Sehr bekannte und renommierte Wissenschaftler haben sich mathematisch mit koordinieren-
den Mechanismen in Form von Verträgen befasst, die bereits in der Praxis ihre Anwendung 
finden. Basierend auf ihren Erkenntnissen, wird in dieser Diplomarbeit zunächst die Entste-
hung der “doppelten Marginalisierung” thematisiert. Weiters wird erläutert, welche Verträge 
in diesem Bereich existieren und welche geeignet erscheinen, die Wertschöpfungskette in 
Bezug auf die Gesamtperformance zu koordinieren, um sie effizienter zu gestalten. 
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